China has implemented a nationwide poverty alleviation campaign, called the targeted poverty alleviation (TPA) strategy, to achieve the national goal of completely eradicating poverty by the end of 2020. However, the capture of political elites is considered an obstacle to achieving this goal. This paper investigates whether political elite capture exists in TPA based on the specific targeting strategy using the “Thousand-Person Hundred-Village” survey dataset in 2017. Overall, TPA is not subject to political elite capture in practice and deliberately excludes political elite households from the strategy. Here, we present three main findings. First, the probability of political elite households registering in the national poverty database (jiandanglika) under TPA is approximately 12.5% lower than that of non-elite households. Second, we found that the lower registration probability of political elite households was mainly reflected in households with committee members in the village. Third, political elite connections increase the likelihood of political elite households receiving general government transfers, suggesting that political elite capture still exists in other public welfare programs.