We estimate games where white supremacist hate groups choose to enter local markets. The model is estimated on a panel of hate-group chapters in United States commuting zones for 2000, 2010, and 2017 using data from the Southern Poverty Law Center, the Decennial Census, American Community Survey, and other sources. We use the revealed preferences of these groups to specify a bivariate ordered probit model of market entry that relates the payoffs of contemporary and traditional hate groups, respectively, to the number of players in the market, in-group size and preferences, Internet access, and an endogeneity correction for the Internet. We find that contemporary and traditional hate groups and are not homogenous. Both groups effectively use the Internet to spread and amplify hate and this effectiveness decreases with in-group education and increases with the share of Republicans in the local market. Key differences are that contemporary group entry increases with in-group size and the out-group’s relative income, and traditional group entry increases with the number of Republicans. We do not find a significant relationship between evangelicals and hate groups, nor do we find a positive relationship with local immigration. Our results are more consistent with the contact hypothesis, which suggests that local interactions between in-group and foreign-born persons can reduce the supply and demand for traditional hate. Our research relates to previous studies of hate. The positive relationship between contemporary hate and out-group status provides empirical support for Glaeser’s (2005) argument that hate is an economic good and that hate groups rationally spread hate to satisfy in-group preferences. It also relates to Fryer and Levitt (2012) who explain the rise of the KKK in the early 1920s in terms of the benefits of group membership, such as personal protection and networking, and the costs, such as social stigma. We are not aware of any study that uses a market entry model, or examines different brands of white supremacist hate and their potential interdependence to examine the incidence of white supremacy. The policy implications from our findings are that more education and diversity can help reduce hate, and, ultimately, political polarization.